on a specifically French context. This holds especially true for the much debated set of questions that have come to be labeled "identity politics," and that constitute today some of the major misunderstandings between Frenchmen and Americans, even as they share progressive and "liberal" views.
The first modern document that defines the rights and obligation of a minority in France was the Decret d'emancipation des Juifs (The Decree Emancipating Jews)-and it did so by pointedly denying them the status of "minority." At the same time, since Jews are the only minority whose presence is recorded in France since the Gaul lic era and whose history, qua minority, is inextricably entwined with French history, the status of French Jews has been both the model and the touchstone for the relationship between other minorities and the Nation.' Not only does the 1791 Decret d'imancipation des Juifs therefore mark a major turning point in the history of the Jews of France, but it is also the document that does the most to reveal the Jacobin stance on nationhood and citizenship that, although hotly debated, continues to prevail today in France.
In the last two or three decades, France has seen an intense renewal of self-questioning by its Jews. Although most of it has been associated with the memory and commemoration of the deportation of Jews to Nazi death camps under the German Occupation and the Vichy regime, I think that it would be a mistake to limit our analysis of this crisis to the aftermath of the Occupation, however tempting this simplification may prove. In this essay, I shall sketch an alternative understanding of French Jewry's current identity crisis. Or rather, since I am neither a historian nor a sociologist, I shall defer instead to La Place de l'etoile by Patrick Modiano, one of the best recent French novels, which, as its author emphatically claims, treats "the Jewish problem and nothing else" ("Entretien" 42 'etoile, published in 1968 , is a strange book. Although it is a first-person narrative, there is hardly a "narrative" to speak of; the plot is inconsistent and truncated; the action tosses the protagonist rather randomly all over Europe and Israel; and the narrator himself is too Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1999] , Art. 5 http://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol23/iss1/5 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1454 mercurial to characterize. Similar liberties are taken with the novel's time-frame: the narrator is, oddly, always in his twenties, appearing alternately as a contributor to Je suis partout, a patient of Freud well after World War II, Eva Braun's lover, and a French Jew in search of his roots in Israel.' To further confound the reader, he is sometimes athletic, tall, dark, and handsome, sometimes dying of tuberculosis, and sometimes (six times, to be precise) actually killedwhich is odd for anyone, but even more so for a narrator who, by definition, must be alive to tell his story.
And yet, paradoxically, despite La Place de l'itoile's disregard for any semblance of verisimilitude (historical, psychological, or other), history-or more precisely French Jewish history-is the novel's major concern. Take the title of the novel, for example. It refers to a site in Paris, in the center of which stands l'Arc de Triomphe, which commemorates Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz. It is also known as a marvel of urban planning that owes its name to the circular confluence of large avenues that form a star, the center of which affords a privileged vantage point over the city-just as Modiano' Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1999] Any revision of collective memory must, however, comply with the patterns that shaped that memory in the first place. Given France's past persecution of Jews, the repeated charges of disloyalty to which they were subjected, given France's promulgation of its own harsh "Jewish Laws" in 1940 and its willing collaboration with the Nazis in the deportation of Jews-given all these constraints, one cannot construct just any memory. Narrative consistency and continuity, logical identity, and psychological coherence impose formidable limitations on a Jew's ability to formulate historical narratives in which he will play a credible part. Jews of France (note that they were not "French") suffered repeated massacres, forced conversions, confiscations of wealth, and frequent exiles that culminated in their final expulsion in 1394 by royal decree (a decree that, incidentally, has never officially been revoked). They were subjected to especially heavy taxation, to laws that forbade them to own land and, often, even to reside within the town limits; they were also excluded from the guilds on which the power of the rising bourgeoisie and the early industrialization of France rested. Gaullism propagated a myth according to which true patriotism had never given in to the pressures of a handful of collaborators. On the international scene, this myth earned France its "rightful" place among the victorious allies. On the national scene it paved the way for national reconciliation and consolidation and let a few convicted collaborators bear the brunt for treason-to the relief of the majority of Frenchmen whose past was, to say the least, tainted." And lo and behold, history went obligingly along, Frenchmen went along, and Paris "forgot" its collaboration with the victorious enemy, forgot the morning papers of the last four years and the partying with the Germans; forgot its pro-Nazi movies, theaters, books, radio, chansoniers, exhibits, and cabarets, and forgot its anti-Semitism (and this time, I am hardly simplifying). With the onset of the Cold War, France also forgot the crucial role the communists had played in the much-touted Resistance and expelled them from the government. Anything that might have harmed the glorious future of France in the new world order was dismissed, repressed, annulled, suppressed, forgotten. As de Gaulle exuberantly proclaimed "Les jours des pleurs sont passes. Les jours de gloire sont revenus" 'the days of mourning are over, the days of glory have returned,' echoing the lyrics of "La Marseillaise," "les jours de gloire sont arrives" 'the days of glory have arrived' (qtd. in Duras 44) . The timing of this proclamation was particularly ironic since it was pronounced on April 3,1945, that is, just as the first concentration and death camp survivors were returning to Paris with their horror stories. All de Gaulle had to offer them was, in so many words, "it's over, let's forget the past and go back to business as usual"-"les jours de published at the same time, were yet another reminder that de Gaulle's days of glory were but a delusion. The party was over.
Tel Aviv-Paris
And what of Tel Aviv, announced by my title? In one of his last journeys, Schlemilovitch goes to Israel. Now, in 1967, the world still saw in Israel more a redeeming myth than a reality. It was a construction meant to counter the negative stereotypes propagated by prewar anti-Semitism. To the charges of cosmopolitanism and lack of national loyalty, "Israel" (I use the quotation marks to refer to the country qua construction until the seventies) opposed a pioneering spirit, brave men and women selflessly committing themselves to a national project and enthusiastically rebuilding their newly reclaimed fatherland-one hand on the steering wheel of a tractor and the other on an Uzi. Whereas in the past, Jews had been accused of being parasites whose shady financial practices exploited the country without contributing to the national economy, "they" now farmed the land and strove for economic self-sufficiency. Whereas the same Jews had been accused of cowardliness, or, worse, of going like cattle to slaughter, "they" now fought proudly and heroically to survive against all odds. Whereas Jews were accused of being sneaky, evasive, and skulking, "they" are now seen as loud, obtrusive, and blunt. In short, "Israel" remained defined by the very same anti-Semitic stereotypes it was said to have dispelled-only a contrario, negatively (even the much praised slogan "Never Again" testifies to this difficult relationship to the past). For the sake of life (Nietzsche), survival (Darwin), action (Bergson), psychological well-being (Freud), "Israel" had turned the page on the Jewish Diaspora and broken its ties with its recent past. In short, "it" had opted for forgetting, not the Saint Barthelemy massacre, not the Collaboration, but the embarrassing death camps. (Let's be clear, however: I am not describing the young state of Israel whose attitude toward the Jewish past was far more complex than its public image conveyed; I am describing how it was perceived.).
If this "Israel" found such strong popular support in France until the late sixties, it was in very large part because "it" corresponded to France's need to consolidate its own future-at the price of forgetting its past (all the more so, since in erasing these years, "Israel" whited out the Genocide and, consequently, the part played by France in its implementation). "Israel" was the mirror image of France's Gaullist national project and, ironically, of the assimilationist tendencies of the majority of its Jews.
All Schlemilovitch has jumped from the frying pan into the fire. His flight from one nation that solves the contradictions that haunt it by disposing of them has led him to a second nation that does the exact same thing, for the very same reasons. Tel Aviv, Paris, Nazi Germany are one and the same. Their underlying principle remains the same: when collective unity rests on the selective elimination of anything and anyone that challenges the story one may wish to believe about oneself and one's country, final solutions abound. French Jews crossed out their "Jewishness"; France crossed out her collaborationist past; "Israel" crossed out Jewish martyrdom; Nazi Germany crossed out her non-Aryans. The major difference between them hinges on the rigor with which this principle was implemented.
In Conclusion I am reminded of the well-known definition of comparison in Aristotelian rhetoric in which understanding a figure of speech such as "Achilles leaped like a lion" requires that we displace our atten-tion from the specificity of each object to the qualities they share: courage, strength, speed, and generosity. Comparison speaks neither of one term nor of the other. Instead, it isolates and brings forth the properties that two distinct objects share, abstracts them so to speak from the objects themselves and submits them-and them alone-to our scrutiny. Achilles is not a lion (it would be absurd to discuss the color of his mane). Nor is Tel Aviv Paris. Yet they share some essential features brought forth by their juxtaposition. All other properties they may have lose any pertinence to the discussion (and to the extent that comparison is thus a figure of " 
